Health-care financing and equity: public insurance in Chile by Urriola, Rafael
61C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 5
HEALTH-CARE FINANCING AND EQUITY: PUBLIC INSURANCE IN CHILE  •  RAFAEL URRIOLA URBINA
Rafael Urriola Urbina
Chief Economist,
Technical Secretariat of the National
Health Fund (FONASA)
Technical Deputy Director for Economics
at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
in Ecuador Former Head of Research
at the Chilean Ministry of Health
✒ rurriola@fonasa.gob.cl
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 5
Health-care financing
and equity:
public insurance in Chile
Rafael Urriola Urbina
This article sets out to examine the sources of health-care financing
and their use, drawing on the health system accounts available in Chile;
the role of public spending at the present time and its effect in reducing
inequities in the Chilean system; and the distribution of health-care
provision by income level in the population. Solidarity and equity seem to
be peculiar to the public sector, although even there equity is found only
in certain types of health-care provision. The article then goes on to analyse
three public insurance (National Health Fund) programmes designed to
reduce inequities in health-care access, which have acted as a test bed
for the current Health Reform Plan in Chile; it reviews the central component
of that reform, the Plan for Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees (Plan
AUGE), which was approved in 2005 and has begun to be gradually applied;
and it describes aspects of financial equity.
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I
Introduction
Health system reforms have been in progress around
the world for over a decade. Interestingly, these reforms
have been taking place simultaneously in countries with
differing development levels, with health-care
institutions that have developed in a variety of ways,
with contrasting approaches to and general conceptions
of health system organization, and with methodologies
that combine instruments and institutions in very
diverse ways.
Everything seems to show that there is no one
“right” institutional solution, no single “winning” model
that can be applied in all situations to resolve today’s
health-care challenges, in particular the increased
demand for medical provision. This increase, and the
longer time period over which demand operates, has
led to health expenditure (both individual and
institutional) growing faster on average than overall
spending by the population.
The fact is that there is a strong positive correlation
between countries’ general economic development,
health expenditure and life expectancy (WHO, 2004).
The goal, then, is to strike a virtuous balance between
excellence in health care and budgetary effectiveness.
This article sets out to examine the fiscal
contribution and some programmes in the Chilean
health sector that have had strong effects on equity in
access to health-care goods and services. Following this
introduction, section II looks at overall health spending
in Chile and its financing sources, highlighting the
duality between the country’s public and private
insurance schemes. It also describes inequalities in
access to health-care goods and services that the
country’s health systems, as now constituted, are
incapable of resolving. Section III describes some
special programmes whose distinguishing feature is that
they target provision and resources on very needy
groups. Although from a general health-care point of
view it is desirable for provision to be universalized,
this kind of piecemeal coverage does mean that
assistance can be provided to those whose low incomes
would otherwise debar them from seeking treatment.
By way of example, three programmes of this type are
examined: Medical Loans (Préstamos Médicos),
Catastrophe Insurance (Seguro Catastrófico) and the
Older Adult Programme (Programa Adulto Mayor).
Section IV reviews the new Plan for Universal Access
with Explicit Guarantees (Plan de Acceso Universal con
Garantías Explícitas (Plan AUGE)), which universalizes
coverage of 56 medical conditions by the public
insurance system and private insurers. Section V
analyses aspects of financial equity. Lastly, section VI
offers some conclusions.
II
Public health financing and equity
Concern about rising health-care costs has led to a
wide debate, and there have been those in Chile who
have ascribed purely financial motives (in particular,
the reduction of public expenditure) to the recent
reforms, ignoring or downplaying their public health
objectives. Public administration must always
involve tight spending controls, but in this case it
should not be forgotten that, while public-sector
health spending increased by 286% in real terms in
the 1990s, GDP also rose considerably over the same
period (by about 100%).
According to recent studies correlating GDP with
health-care expenditure over long periods, the latter
tends to grow faster than GDP in the early stage of
development and then to converge with and even grow
more slowly than it in subsequent stages (López
Casasnovas, 2004). Chile is probably in the early phase
described for the European Union in the study cited.
For a comparative examination of health spending
in relation to the institutional configuration of each
country, this spending needs to be broken down by
financing source: first, the direct fiscal contribution,
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plus contributions from municipalities which
supplement that from the State budget; second, the
health insurance contributions that people are obliged
by law to pay to the public insurance fund (the National
Health Fund (FONASA)) or private health insurance
institutions (Isapres), plus compulsory contributions to
mutuales (mutual support societies) to cover
occupational accidents.
Private health expenditure, meanwhile, includes all
forms of individual or group insurance designed to cover
health problems, plus additional voluntary contributions
by subscribers and out-of-pocket expenditure, which
strictly speaking is that which beneficiaries carry out
themselves without reimbursement because they are
wholly or partially uninsured.
Table 1 shows the distribution of spending in Chile
in 2003 (Urriola, 2004). What is most significant is that
the direct fiscal contribution had to be increased greatly
(by 32%) between 2000 and 2003 to make up for health-
care shortcomings (Comisión de Reforma, 2003). In
2003, the public contribution accounted for 67.1% of
total health expenditure.
TABLE 1
Chile: Health system accounts, 2003
(Millions of current pesos)
Public sector Private sector
Providersa Direct subsidy Compulsory contributions Out-of-pocket spending
Fiscal Municipal FONASA Friendly Isapres Voluntary Services Drugs Other Total
 societies contribs. to copay- copay- directs
(mutuales) Isapres  ments  ments
Public sector 544 778 44 051 350 766 3 638 16 415 5 311 0 0 73 018 1 037 977
SNSS establishments 455 545 339 100 65 697 860 342
Municipal PHC 44 051 44 051
ISP 3 072 199 4 177 7 448
Hospitals run by armed
forces and by Orden 82 564 82 564
Hospital J.J. Aguirre 3 597 11 467 3 638 16 415 5 311 3 144 43 572
Private sector 0 0 119 762 116 494 343 742 147 484 265 895 0 32 539 1 025 916
Hospitals, clinics
and professionals 119 762 343 742 147 484 265 895 32 539 909 422
Friendly societies 116 494 116 494
Administration 0 0 16 494 15 835 76 575 32 506 0 0 0 141 410
FONASA 16 494 16 494
Isapres 76 575 32 506 109 081
Friendly societies 15 835 15 835
Health authority 115 816 115 816
Pharmacies 101 009 0 0 363 296 0 464 305
Public spending 101 009 101 009
Private spending 363 296 363 296
Unassigned 5 446 3 777 1 603 10 826
Total 761 603 44 051 487 022 141 413 440 509 186 904 265 895 363 296 105 557 2 796 250
% 27.2% 1.6% 17.4% 5.1% 15.8% 6.7% 9.5% 13.0% 3.8% 100.0%
Source: Urriola (2004).
a SNSS: Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud (National System of Health Services). PHC: primary health care. ISP: Instituto de Salud
Pública de Chile (Public Health Institute). FONASA: Fondo Nacional de Salud (National Health Fund). Isapres: Instituciones de Salud
Previsional (private health insurance institutions).
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According to official statistics (FONASA, 2004a), the
number of people in the public insurance scheme1
increased by about 6% in the 1990s and comprised 67%
of the population, while the direct fiscal contribution
increased by 286% in real terms over the same period, as
already mentioned. This might seem excessive at first sight,
but in fact it represents a deliberate effort to make up for
low government health spending in the 1980s. Even as it
is, average annual health expenditure per inhabitant in
Chile is just US$ 139, according to the World Health
Organization (WHO), which is much less than in Argentina
or Uruguay and similar to the level in Mexico (table 2).
Because of the rise in fiscal spending, the public
health sector in Chile has achieved greater equity in
recent years. There is a further justification for the
increase, which is that average revenues from individual
contributions differ enormously between the public and
private systems. In 2003, average contributions per
beneficiary were 46,032 pesos2  in the public insurance
system and 161,427 pesos in the private system. The
direct fiscal contribution increased the average per
capita revenue available in the public system to 114,377
pesos, i.e., its net impact was to reduce inequalities
between the public and private sectors.3
The revenue gap between the public insurance system
and private insurers is also due to the fact that the State
takes responsibility for the 20% or so of the population
who declare they have no income (at least no stable
income), and that it is necessarily the repository for those
excluded from the Isapres because of the “skimming”4
these carry out among potential subscribers.
There are various indicators for rating people by
risk. Table 3 shows that higher-risk groups (children
and older adults) are predominantly enrolled in FONASA.
For example, the public sector covers a very high
proportion of older adults (92%), this being the most
vulnerable group in Chile and indeed in most Latin
American countries. This is an instance of what has been
called sociodemographic vulnerability, i.e., “a syndrome
combining potentially adverse sociodemographic events
(risks), incapacity to respond to the materialization of
those risks, and inability to adapt actively to the new
situation generated by that materialization” (ECLAC, 2002).
Where health is concerned, the vulnerability of older
adults derives from the increasing need for health services
with age, a lack of active social security to provide them
with adequate incomes, and the weaknesses of public
and private infrastructure when it comes to coping with
differentiated demand. These are urgent challenges for
the region in the immediate future.
The financial proof of this vulnerability (incapacity
to respond) can be found in the incomes of the country’s
pensioners (retirees) in 2003. The pensions curve in
figure 1 shows that 60% of them receive incomes of
less than 81,457 pesos a month.
TABLE 2
Various countries: Government health
spending in dollars between 1997 and 2001
(Dollar average per inhabitant,
at the average exchange rate)
Country Government health spending in dollars per inhabitant










1 Excluding the armed forces, although their network of hospitals
is taken into account in Table 1.
2 Dollar values have been calculated for all purposes using the
average annual value published by the Central Bank of Chile, which
was 691.4 pesos per dollar in 2003.
3 For those wishing to compare this information against the balance
sheets of the Superintendency of Health Insurance Institutions or
FONASA that show the total value of contributions, it should be noted
that incapacity benefits (subsidios por incapacidad laboral (SIL)),
which are payments for days not worked, have not been treated as
health spending and have therefore not been included in table 2 or in
average expenditure calculations. This spending could be included
in a broader satellite account, however, such as social security.
4 By “skimming” is meant discriminatory risk selection whereby
higher premiums are charged to higher-risk individuals, so that
those who ultimately remain in the private insurance schemes are
individuals representing a lower risk or lower average costs. This
disadvantages those at higher risk, such as older adults, women of
childbearing age and people with chronic diseases.
FIGURE 1
Chile: Monthly pensioner incomes,
by income band, 2003
Taxable monthly income
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To sum up, the State is mainly required to cover
those at highest risk: older adults, women of
childbearing age, and those with chronic illnesses.
From the general perspective of a mixed (public/
private) health system like Chile’s, it might be
concluded that the existence of private-sector provision
has led to: i) greater competition, both because of the
tendency for health-care charges to even out between
the public and private insurers5  and because the public
sector has been forced to modernize, something that is
reflected in rising approval ratings for public-sector
provision in surveys; ii) a 30% increase in the voluntary
contributions made by subscribers to private insurance
policies on top of their compulsory contributions (table
1), enabling the quality of plans to be improved for
those with “normal” risk levels; and iii) an improvement
in the country’s general health infrastructure.
The criticisms made of this mixed system are also
telling, however: it is charged with i) increasing the
level of inequity, because the public sector takes in the
poorest, most vulnerable and most “expensive”
individuals, which means it is neither limiting the
“skimming” carried out by private insurers nor using
pooled inter-institutional solidarity funds to provide
compensatory financing; ii) displaying, as is
recognized, a degree of arbitrariness in the costs of
individual plans, since information asymmetries make
it very difficult to choose properly between health plans
when there are thousands of options available; iii)
creating superfluous and costly marketing competition
that drives up private-sector costs;6  and iv) making it
hard or impossible to optimize overall health planning,
since there is the element of uncertainty represented
by those who may move from one subsystem to the
other.
Lastly, the public and private sectors differ in the
way they cover spending on drugs (other than those
included in Plan AUGE). Whereas the private-sector
insurers’ plans never include medicines, the public
insurer does cover them in the case of primary care for
category A and B FONASA users, i.e., the indigent and
those earning up to one minimum wage.7  Of total
spending on medicines, in fact, about 22% comes from
the public sector and the rest is private spending.
According to regional estimates (table 4), drug spending
in Chile is below the regional average, although it
represents about 16% of total health spending.
More generally, accepting that out-of-pocket
spending is detrimental to equity, it should be noted
that about 10% of the population in Chile does not
appear in the health insurance coverage figures, while
in Latin America the percentage of people without cover
is put at 25% (Titelman and Uthoff, 2000).
Reducing out-of-pocket spending is also a goal
of the current reforms. To do this, it will be necessary
to increase coverage and exert better control over the
way medicines are administered, particularly where
the use of generic and alternative drugs is concerned.
In Chile, generic drugs account for 41% of
TABLE 3
Chile: Age and sex distribution of the population,
by insurance type, 2001
Age group National Health Fund Subscribers to private health
(FONASA) subscribers insurance institutions (Isapres)
Men Women FONASA total Men Women Isapre total
0 - 4 450 725 436 096 886 821 135 343 126 862 262 205
5 - 19 1 515 551 1 434 176 2 949 727 411 002 392 716 803 718
20 - 44 1 623 376 1 984 338 3 607 714 636 280 625 645 1 261 925
45 - 64 813 634 988 553 1 802 187 244 436 258 016 502 452
65 and over 370 204 539 711 909 915 37 206 43 282 80 488
Total 4 773 490 5 382 874 10 156 364 1 464 267 1 446 521 2 910 788
Source: FONASA Subdepartamento de Estudios.
5 The public insurance agency acts as a regulator in this respect,
particularly where the cost of consultations is concerned, since the
different types of provision have fixed levels of coverage set
annually in advance.
6 In 2003, per capita administration costs were 1,559 pesos in
FONASA and 39,970 pesos in the Isapres, i.e., 26 times as high.
7 Often, however, surgeries do not have enough drugs available
and users have to buy them for themselves in private-sector
pharmacies.
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consumption in unit terms, and for just 8% of total
drugs spending (IMS, 2004).
Reforms, however, have tended to increase
copayments (included in out-of-pocket expenditure) with
a view to reducing “moral hazard”. No-one has yet shown
convincingly, however, how high copayments can go
before they lead to exclusion.
It has been argued that where there is no guarantee
of universal access to health services, rules are needed
to mitigate the disadvantages of those who have no
certainty of receiving prompt treatment because they
have no resources to spare. What this amounts to is a
suggestion that copayments be reduced, at least for the
worse-off. Here, the dichotomy of “Isapres for the rich
and FONASA for the poor” (Sapelli and Torche, 1997),
besides its somewhat pejorative connotations, does
convey the fact that solidarity and equity are peculiar
to the public sector, although the equity (as will be seen)
is incomplete, i.e., it is segmented by type of service.
The findings of a recent study (Van Doorslaer and
Masseria, 2004) carried out at the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) bear
out the claim just quoted.
1. Income levels and the demand for services
Analyses of demand always differentiate demand for
services by household income levels (Mahieu, 2000;
Titelman, 1999). To this end, the population is grouped
by income quintiles8  to ascertain whether there are
significant differences by stratum in health service
demand.
Table 5 suggests a number of conclusions. First,
in Chile the block of services constituted by primary
care (check-ups and general consultations) and
emergency care has achieved a level of coverage such
that there is no discrimination in access by income
quintile. This is not the case, though, with the second
block of services: specialist consultations, dental care,
laboratory tests and imaging services (X-rays and
ultrasound).
When the quintile averages are compared, it
transpires that lower-income households actually
receive more services in the first block, so that the
percentage deviation from the mean in the demand for
these services is higher in the low-income quintiles.
This indicates that these strata face no restrictions on
access to such services; indeed, the question arises as
to whether the effect known as “moral hazard” (the
tendency for services to be used wastefully when they
are cheap or free) does not arise in this situation.9
TABLE 4
Ten countries and one region of Latin America: Drug spending and consumption (2003)
Country Total spending 2001 population Per capita consumption
(millions of dollars) (thousands) (units)
Argentina 3 656 37 487 9
Brazil 4 939 172 891 7
Chile 513a 15 402 11
Colombia 915 43 070 7
Ecuador 426 12 880 9
Mexico 6 605 100 373 10
Peru 335 26 090 2
Dominican Republic 252 8 624 4
Uruguay 262 3 361 15
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1 775 24 632 14
Central America 654 55 658 2
Total 20 332 500 468 7
Source: IMS Health (undated).
a This figure does not match that of table 1. We believe that the difference is essentially due to the fact that this table does not include
public drugs spending.
8 This grouping has been carried out directly by the Ministry of
Planning (MIDEPLAN) in its database, using only autonomous
household incomes.
9 See Sapelli and Vial (2001) for a discussion of the Chilean
situation.
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In the second block of services, on the other hand,
those without resources (in particular, those in FONASA
categories A and B) either have to face excessively long
waiting lists or times for medical attention or else pay
all or part of the cost themselves it they wish to be
treated promptly. As soon as any payment is required,
there is a striking reduction in demand from the first
two income quintiles, presumably because they cannot
afford the cost of prompt treatment and so refrain from
using services (table 5).
Proportionately, types of provision at which the
public service excels in terms of efficacy, coverage and
timeliness are used more by lower-income sectors than
by higher-income ones. One hypothesis that should be
considered here, of course, is that people in these sectors
over-react to possible illnesses. There is a good deal of
evidence that demand for emergency treatment is often
driven more by individual perceptions than by the
existence of what might be clinically understood as an
emergency, and that a substantial proportion of such
treatment could have been provided in a normal primary
care setting.
Nonetheless, it has been estimated (Ipinza, 2004)
that in 2002 the staffs of health-care professionals at
municipally-run primary care establishments (public
system) were 50% under strength, which would account
for the “flight” of patients at that level. This is
compounded by the saturation of treatment facilities,
as revealed by the fact that 24 treatment centres have
more than 40,000 people registered with them
(Ministerio de Salud, 2002b). Together, these two
situations help to account for the overloading of the
country’s emergency services.
In the case of dental care, laboratory tests and
imaging, differences in demand by income quintile
appear to be due to low-income sectors having to go
without these services because they simply cannot
afford them.
Where specialist consultations are concerned, on
the other hand, more information is needed before any
conclusions can be ventured, since there is also evidence
that groups with full medical coverage make use of such
consultations without professional referral. The “filter”
of referral, which is applied in various countries, has
proved effective at holding down unnecessary spending
on this type of provision.10
The information given in table 5, then, shows
horizontal inequity in Chile, i.e., the extent to which
people with the same need for health services have
different utilization rates. This inequity is plain to see
in the specialist consultations, dental care and imaging
block, but it is reduced by public action, as the following
section explains.
TABLE 5
Chile: Deviation of demand from the mean,
by provision type, in the bottom two income
quintiles and the top two quintiles
(Percentages)
Provision type Low-income High-income
40% 40%
Preventive health check-up 12.9 -17.4
General consultation 5.3 -7.7
Emergency consultation 17.7 -33.4
Specialist consultation -25.7 16.6
Dental care -28.6 18.3
Laboratory tests -11.8 8.6
X-rays or ultrasound -25.2 10.6
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the National Socio-
economic Survey (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica
Nacional (CASEN)), 2000.
10 The health reform operating in France since January 2005 makes
it more expensive for people to go to specialists if they do not have
a referral from the primary care level.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 568
HEALTH-CARE FINANCING AND EQUITY: PUBLIC INSURANCE IN CHILE  •  RAFAEL URRIOLA URBINA
III
Public programmes to reduce
health-care inequity
This section looks at three special FONASA programmes
that positively target their beneficiary income groups.
These are the programmes known as Préstamos
Médicos (Medical Loans), Seguro Catastrófico
(Catastrophe Insurance) and Programa Adulto Mayor
(Older Adult Programme), whose equity goals have
since been adopted by Plan AUGE (analysed in section
IV below).
1. Medical Loans
Medical Loans, also known as “health loans”, are part
of the sphere of action of the National Health Plan.
They are provided by FONASA to low-income
beneficiaries to finance all or part of the amount they
are required to pay for health services received from
the public-sector provider or from private-sector
providers.
Health loans are very important, since they are
extraordinary in nature and may be granted to deal with
situations where lives are at risk. They can cover:
– The whole of the copayment for services that
qualify as emergency treatment or for medicines
provided in the specialist surgeries of public
establishments
– Up to 42.5% of the total level 1 value of medical
care resulting in a programme of treatment or
acquisition of orthoses
– Acquisition of prostheses (optical lenses and
hearing aids, for example)
– Hospitalization (one night minimum)
– Psychiatric and radiotherapy treatments
– 100% financing for patients undergoing dialysis
(this category, now part of Plan AUGE, accounted
for the bulk of this type of financing until 2002)
– Surgical operations included in the “Su Cuenta
Conocida” (“Know Your Bill”) system of
Diagnosis-Linked Payment (Pago Asociado a
Diagnóstico (PAD))11
The baskets of services covered by this method
(all subsequently included in Plan AUGE) are:
– PAD Cataracts basket
– PAD Childbirth basket
– PAD Gallstones basket
– PAD Prostatic Hyperplasia basket
Loans may be applied for by FONASA subscribers
and their legal dependants (table 6).12
As table 6 shows, it is the lower-income groups
that are the main recipients of these loans. Furthermore,
according to the same source as was used for the table,
pensioners and older adults receive 76% and 54%,
respectively, of the funds allocated through this
mechanism, which confirms that these loans play a
compensating role conducive to greater equity.
The principle of gradualism that has been applied
in the Chilean health reform is illustrated by the
following: in 2003, the amount of PAD resources
allocated to the PAD Cataracts and PAD Childbirth baskets
fell, essentially because charges were cut and
allowances increased for both of these. Then in July
2005, when Plan AUGE had institutionalized medical
conditions, broadened coverage and established an
enforceable and universal right to treatment for new
health problems (see section IV below), these baskets
were included in that Plan, so that exceptionality was
eliminated as a mechanism for resolving situations of
exclusion caused by lack of resources.
2. Catastrophe Insurance
In the mid-1990s the health authorities drew up a
register of complex treatment, characterized as being
of high cost, being provided by highly specialized
professionals, requiring sophisticated and expensive
technological support, and accounting for a large
proportion of the total spending of public health
11 Diagnosis-Linked Payment (PAD) is a payment mechanism used
by FONASA in Chile. It is an arrangement between the insurer and
the provider whereby payment is made for a fixed sum covering a
set of medical services so that a particular medical condition or
diagnosis can be resolved in its entirety.
12 Those qualifying as indigent (group A) are entitled to free care.
Loans are for those who have some income, and are thus required
to make a copayment.
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establishments (for which reason waiting lists had been
rising sharply) (Jarpa, 2005).
With this information the authorities sought, first
of all, to create a programme that would link health
priorities to the payment mechanisms in use, with a
view to reducing the disincentives to higher-cost
treatment provision in the public services, such as the
fear of being “marked down” for increasing hospital
debt.
A resolution of the Ministry of Health and Treasury
(Resolución Exenta 1885 of 28 November 1997)
provided guarantees of free treatment for the first
medical conditions to be covered by what was legally
known at that time as Catastrophe Insurance (Seguro
Catastrófico). Products or baskets of products benefiting
from PAD financing were defined for this purpose,
including medical services (bed/days, tests and
procedures, surgery), frequency of use, unit prices and
total cost. These baskets (groups of services) were
compiled on the basis of expert opinion and reviews of
clinical records, supported by Chilean and international
studies.
Thus, as health services came to be reimbursed at
actual prices for treating the medical conditions now
termed catastrophic, they no longer had any reason to
maintain long waiting lists. The beneficiaries of
Catastrophe Insurance, meanwhile, began to receive
100% financial coverage, with no additional payments.
In addition, what was later to become one of the core
principles of the health reform began to become
established: guaranteed treatment times, along with
preferential attention as better information on user
rights, a telephone assistance service and a gradually
developing complaints system became available.
As table 7 shows, most of the diseases originally
covered by Catastrophe Insurance were subsequently
“universalized” in Plan AUGE.
AIDS was included among these diseases in 2001,
and it too was then covered by Plan AUGE. In 2003, the
bulk of the medical services13  provided consisted in
palliative care (45,712), antineoplastic drugs from the
National Antineoplastic Drugs Programme (Programa
Nacional de Drogas Antineoplásicas) (11,328), complex
cancer tests (8,300) and cervical cancer treatments
(7,802). The largest spending items, on the other hand,
were dialysis (10.25 billion pesos), heart surgery (9.854
billion pesos) and AIDS (8.83 billion pesos).
Between early 1999 and late 2004, about US$ 350
million were spent on relieving the financial impact of
medical conditions affecting over 200,000 people. In
most cases, these costs could not have been met by them
individually.
The risk of health problems being compounded by
financial disaster has always been there, particularly
for those who have private-sector insurance plans with
restricted coverage. In fact, as FONASA brought new
diseases into its Catastrophe Insurance (AIDS, for
example), the Isapres were obliged to offer similar
benefits to retain their customers.
Indeed, Catastrophe Insurance opened the way for
a debate which culminated in the reform of financial
guarantee coverage in Plan AUGE, when it was finally
established that subscribers to FONASA and the Isapres
would be subject to a maximum copayment of 20% for
health problems covered by Plan AUGE, with the
TABLE 6
Chile: Medical loans granted, by beneficiary
income band, 1999 to August 2004
Income band Number of loans Total amount Amount as
(in pesos) (millions of pesos)  % of total
0 - 50 000 8 172 8 129 6.6
50 000 - 75 000 24 953 25 920 21.2
75 000 - 100 000 32 616 47 401 38.6
100 000 - 150 000 32 309 19 519 15.9
150 000 - 200 000 20 381 7 447 6.1
200 000 - 250 000 12 510 4 433 3.6
250 000 - 300 000 7 402 3 019 2.5
Over 300 000 13 283 6 983 5.7
Total 15 626 122 850 100
Source: National Health Fund (FONASA) Departamento de Finanzas.
13 The difference from table 7 is due to the fact that a given case/
person may receive a number of medical services.
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additional safeguard of an annual upper limit not
exceeding 17%, approximately, of the subscriber’s
annual income.
3. The Older Adult Programme
The goal of this programme is to improve older adults’
quality of life by equipping them with orthotic and
prosthetic aids to prevent their functional capabilities
from declining, and to expand the coverage of treatment
for the most common and costly medical conditions
affecting this age group.
The need for special compensating programmes
for older adults derives from the low pensioner coverage
and benefit levels of the country’s social security
system, as figure 1 showed. Accordingly, since 2001
older adults have been entitled to free health care under
the FONASA Institutional Treatment Method (Modalidad
de Atención Institucional (MAI)), irrespective of income.
Those aged 65 and over are expected to make up 9% of
the population by 2010, and on present trends the
institutional supply of services for them is believed to
be inadequate.
The diseases that cause most deaths among older
adults are: ischaemic heart disease (i.e., diseases of the
coronary arteries), cerebrovascular diseases, and
pneumonia or serious lung and bronchial infections.
All these are treated under the Older Adult Programme
(table 8), which has about 100,000 beneficiaries
annually (some 10% of the population in this age
group).
The public health system also conducts
prevention campaigns aimed at this group, the most
important being the so-called “winter campaign”.
This campaign includes mass vaccination
programmes; an expansion in the number of hospital
TABLE 7
Chile: Catastrophe Insurance, 1999-2004
(Number of cases)
Area 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2004
(projection)
Heart surgerya 2 730 2 933 3 377 4 267 7 745 9 710
Neurosurgery 1 787 1 952 2 257 3 355 6 052 10 210
Kidney transplantb 233 248 218 225 221 236
Liver transplant 24 27 27 26 26 36
Peritoneal dialysisb 45 55 61 64 72 91
Radiotherapya 4 492 4 499 4 758 5 096 4 568 7 848
PNDAa c 104 82 103 956 944 1 172
Immunosuppressive drugsb 1 281 1 418 1 639 1 793 2 111 2 145
Scoliosisb 251 205 212 263 277 425
Cleft palateb 428 595 740 941 1 008 1 427
Major burns 196 271 218 218 212 221
Multiple trauma 88 87 86 82 52 68
Palliative careb 4 065 5 662 5 772 6 583 11 428 12 898
Haemodialysisb 63 802 823 1 229 1 779 2 549
Bone marrow transplantb 4 11 15 18 18 20
Breast cancer chemotherapyb 193 518 756 1 169 1 546 1 830
AIDS
b 0 0 1 657 3 308 4 038 5 700
Cervical cancer chemotherapyb 0 0 0 626 469 602
Vitrectomy 0 0 0 740 818 858
Cystic fibrosis 0 0 0 225 280 292
Pre-invasive and invasive surgical
  treatment for cervical cancerb 0 0 0 0 7 902 8 104
Total 15 984 19 365 22 719 31 184 51 566 66 442
Source: National Health Fund (FONASA) Departamento de Comercialización.
a As of 2005, part is in Plan AUGE and part remains in Catastrophe Insurance.
b As of 2005, forms part of Plan AUGE.
c Programa Nacional de Drogas Antineoplásicas (National Antineoplastic Drugs Programme).
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beds to receive the worst-affected patients who
require hospitalization; the preparation of special
treatment rooms in surgeries for acute respiratory
infections and acute respiratory diseases; and special
weekend opening of surgeries in areas where this is
called for. The Golden Years Programme (Programa
Años Dorados) also provides a food supplement to
over-70s who are registered with a surgery in this
programme and are up to date with their health and
chronic disease check-ups.
All these special programmes and subprogrammes
were created in response to needs that were made
known by subscribers themselves and that they could
not have met on their own, as far as can be judged,
had exceptional financing not been made available.
As universal provision of all or some services
gradually becomes institutionalized under Plan
AUGE, targeted compensatory programmes like the
ones described wil l  tend to be redefined or
subsumed into a broader plan. Indeed, Plan AUGE
was created to deal with problems that had been
found over time to be of high priority and that were
being addressed piecemeal by the programmes
mentioned.
IV
Plan AUGE (Universal Access
with Explicit Guarantees)
1. Background
Plan AUGE, the centrepiece of health reform in Chile,
was embodied in law 19966 of 3 September 2004 and
came into force on 1 July 2005. This plan established
explicit guarantees based on principles of clinical
efficiency (resolving the most prevalent health
problems), timeliness (treatment deadlines), quality (the
use of protocols to standardize procedures) and equity
(in financing and access).
As a number of studies have pointed out, health
goals need to be compatible with the financial resources
available; to establish these goals, furthermore, thought
must be given to considerations of sustainability,
efficiency, effectiveness and equity (BASYS/CEPS/CREDES/
IGSS, 2004).
To ensure that Plan AUGE matched the resources
available, a technical parameter was developed by
means of a model that prioritized health problems in
the context of the Plan, the idea being to provide a firm
basis for decisions about inclusion and exclusion and
also to guide implementation decisions.
The prioritization algorithm (figure 2) used criteria
that are commonly employed to establish health
priorities (Ministerio de Salud, 1999), and it represents
the logic applied in the general design of Plan AUGE.
TABLE 8
Chile: Beneficiaries of the Older Adult
Programme, 2002 and 2003
Older Adult 2002 2003 %
Programme Number Number change
Lenses 58 550 59 462 1.6
Hearing aids 4 921 4 845 -1.5
Walking sticks 5 542 3 987 -28.1
Wheelchairs 2 265 1 807 -20.2
Walking frames 536 509 -5.0
Ulcer mattresses 1 382 1 123 -18.7
Ulcer cushions 361 313 -13.3
Dental Basket Type I 3 811 2 895 -24.0
Dental Basket Type II 9 694 8 452 -12.8
Other orthoses and prostheses – –
Prostheses and orthoses
 subtotal 87 062 83 393 -4.2
Cataracts 7 036 6 994 -0.6
Fitting of pacemaker 1 157 1 233 6.6
Full hip replacement 711 654 -8.0
Partial hip replacement 730 757 3.7
Femur neck fracture,
osteosynthesis 1 042 1 207 15.8
Photocoagulation 1 865 1 969 5.6
Catastrophic diseases
subtotal 12 541 12 814 2.2
Acute respiratory disease 1 677 1 677 0.0
Overall total 101 280 97 884 -3.4
Spending each year,
in thousands of pesos 9 852 961 10 759 008 9.20
Source: National Health Fund (FONASA) Departamento de
Comercialización, Subdepartamento de Intermediación.
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Using criteria of scale (number of cases, adjusted
for data quality), significance (years of life lost,
mortality, equity and user preferences) and vulnerability
(existence of effective treatment), a ranking of scores
was constructed to establish health priorities.
The sequencing and structure of Plan AUGE show
that it has four priority areas. The first is primary care
in the National System of Health Services (Sistema
Nacional de Servicios de Salud (SNSS)), which includes
an All-round Family Care Model (Modelo de Atención
Integral Familiar), with the services and activities that
form part of the Family Health Plan (Plan de Salud
Familiar). This covers preventive and curative care,
delivered by a family health-care team with a family
doctor; it also incorporates individual promotional
activities, special programmes like mental health and
cardiovascular health, preventive tests, general health
programmes for children, adolescents, women and older
adults, medical check-ups, consultations for acute
illnesses, diagnostic tests, referrals to specialists and
other activities such as home visits.
The second area is emergency treatment. Plan AUGE
requires a review of every area of emergency care to
ensure there is a nationwide treatment system in place
that can provide appropriate pre-hospital care,
transportation, diagnostics, stabilization measures and
emergency treatment to prevent loss of life and
functional impairment.
The third area is the ranking of health problems
by priority, taking into account their scale, significance,
cost, equity gaps and the needs and preferences made
known by users themselves, and the search for the
treatment methods that will be most effective in
resolving these problems in their entirety.
The fourth area is the use of the Personal Health
Plan (Plan de Salud de las Personas) to relate the
medical conditions included in Plan AUGE with all others,
since the Personal Health Plan deals with all health
problems not covered by the guaranteed treatment
system.
Plan AUGE described the medical services and
activities deemed necessary and effective from the point
of view of all-round health care, identifying the
population that would benefit from universal access,
maximum waiting times, the use of standardized
evidence-based procedures to assure quality, and the
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WEIGHTING: SEQUENTIAL AND SIMULTANEOUS
Source: Ministerio de Salud (2002b).
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amount of the copayment and/or deductible that would
be considered acceptable in the light of the financial
protection concept.
It also established certain conditions for access and
related these to the guarantees (for example, people will
not have access to emergency treatment in the relevant
network for a health problem that is not clinically
classified as an emergency; in this case treatment must
be refused or the patient must be charged the full cost).
Thus, it clearly set out people’s obligations as well as
their guaranteed benefits and enforceable rights.
It also identified priority tasks that needed to be
performed in 2002 and 200314  to arrive at more accurate
estimates of demand and to develop technical
instruments (including performance algorithms or
treatment protocols), administrative tools and
information and follow-up systems.
2. Review of health priorities
Even before Plan AUGE was approved, it was recognized
that it would need to specify the scope of coverage for
each medical condition (diagnosis, treatment and
follow-up) as well as timescales and quality. The scope
of coverage can be interpreted as an adjustment variable
to ensure a harmonious relationship between the
infrastructure capacity and financial resources available
and the level of actual demand in each case.
When the baskets of services were designed and
reviewed, account was taken of which services were
necessary and appropriate to resolve the illness or health
condition concerned in its entirety, and also of the
services currently provided by FONASA under the
Diagnosis-Linked Payment (PAD) system. For each
medical condition, an estimate was made of the
frequency of occurrence or number of cases expected.
National rates of incidence and prevalence were used
where available; otherwise, international rates were
adapted on expert advice.
Once these specifications had been arrived at, an
assumption was applied to determine expected demand
(cases to be treated in one year). For serious, high-cost
conditions such as cancer and severe trauma, it was
assumed that 100% of cases would require treatment.
It was also assumed that between 50% and 70% of
chronic diseases, including cases where symptoms were
more severe, would generate demand for treatment, and
that this percentage would increase over time as
promotion and prevention programmes were introduced
or strengthened.
For 35% of illnesses, prevalence or incidence rates
were calculated using Chilean data. For another 33%,
experts estimated needs and forecast demand on the
basis of Chilean and international information, while
for the remaining 32% expected demand was forecast
from the demand met in the last few years.15
Recalculation will have to be carried out, chiefly to
ascertain accurately the effect that the provision of
explicit coverage and marginal price guarantees under
Plan AUGE has had on demand, as these guarantees did
not previously exist.
Differences in the reliability (coverage) of the
initial information had a major effect on subsequent
projections. Projections for HIV/AIDS, for example, were
based on the demand met in the public sector, and the
resulting underestimation meant that shortages of drugs
for this disease emerged in mid-2004.
3. Rules to assure quality and timeliness
of provision under Plan AUGE
One goal of Plan AUGE is universal access, so the
relevant guarantee is that coverage will be available for
100% of the population. Where quality is concerned,
the objective, from a technical standpoint, is to identify
the set of attributes that will maximize the likelihood
of treatment yielding the results desired, including
greater user satisfaction, on the basis of current
knowledge. The quality guarantee also covers the
requirements that providers (establishments and
individuals) have to meet to ensure the quality of the
service they provide.
Measures to improve quality of care are manifold,
as the national strategy described in the National Health
Goals (Objetivos Sanitarios Nacionales) makes clear:
they include the use of epidemiological methodology
and information systems to enhance diagnostic and
treatment capabilities, evidence-based medicine,
procedures standardized by the health authority and
accreditation systems.
Furthermore, in its “Construcción de la propuesta
técnica del régimen de garantías en salud Año Base”
(Ministerio de Salud, 2002b, Volume I), the Ministry
14 These were revised subsequently, as the concept of gradualism
was introduced in the implementation of Plan AUGE as a whole.
15 To arrive at these conclusions, use was made of data compilations
setting out information sources and the assumptions employed to
estimate frequencies.
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of Health laid down the following criteria for
determining treatment access times for the different
groups of problems:
– Perception of urgency or need
– Health problems where treatment delays would
cause serious harm
– Health problems declared to be of high priority
– Priority prevention measures
The following access times were determined on
the basis of the above:
Immediate treatment: Urgent health problems that
pose a risk of death or severe and irremediable after-
effects unless treated immediately.
Treatment within 24 or 48 hours: Consultations for
acute illnesses. Prioritized health problems for which,
as an intervention strategy, preventive or curative
treatment is required at specific times and cannot be
delayed (for example, care of newborn children,
immunization schedule).
Treatment within 7 to 30 days:
– Consultations for non-acute illnesses
– Check-ups after therapy
– Consultations for chronic illnesses that are not in
an acute stage
– Consultations with specialists and access to
diagnostic procedures
– Evaluation of clinical studies
– Initiation of treatment when the waiting time does
not prejudice the outcome
Treatment according to the resolution time that is
necessary and practicable for each health problem as
measured by:
– Maximum possible waiting time before symptoms
worsen or complications or after-effects arise (e.g.:
one to three months for elective surgery to deal
with a non-acute medical condition currently
included in the prompt treatment programme
(programa de oportunidad de la atención (POA)):
gallstones and prostatic hyperplasia)
– Maximum waiting time within which the therapy
is still effective (heart surgery, correction of
malformations, hernia of the nucleus pulposus,
antiretroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS), depending on
severity
– For preventive activities, maximum waiting time
that does not affect attainment of the goal (e.g.:
frequency of preventive health check-ups for
adults)
– In the case of support for basic sense faculties,
waiting time that does not affect people’s
development and functionality (e.g.: lenses,
hearing aids, cataract surgery).
V
Financial equity, public-sector
provision and payment methods
Once health-care needs have been determined, another
important aspect has to be considered: the actual ability
of the public sector to provide health services under
the Institutional Treatment Method (MAI) with the
available financial resources. Since unit costs are lower
with the MAI than with the Free Choice Method
(Modalidad de Libre Elección (MLE)), efforts could be
made to discourage use of the latter, but it does not
seem advisable to shift demand to highly congested
public facilities. The Reform Commission (Comisión
de Reforma) recommended that consideration be given
to alternative ways of operating the MLE to boost
efficiency and medical impact, such as per capita
payments to private-sector providers with responsibility
for a given population or payments per medical
condition resolved, and that subscribers be required to
opt for one method or the other each year.
There is a long-standing and still unresolved debate
about the best methods of payment. A number of studies
have looked at the issue of which payment methods
can best meet the needs of Plan AUGE in the public health
system while remaining consistent with health policy
and avoiding possible distortions in incentives.
Change has been faster, deeper and more effective
in primary care (Bitrán, Giedion and Gómez, 2004) than
in hospital care, which is an argument in favour of
payments for services or groups of services provided.
Conversely, the historical method of payment, which
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is based on past spending unrelated to any specific
population or predetermined level of service provision,
does not seem to be effective, even though 60% of the
Ministry of Health budget is still spent in this way.
The most common proposals are for: i) the adoption
of payment mechanisms that link payment to output or
results; ii) new mechanisms to make these results
enforceable by FONASA; and iii) explicit specification
of spending items for public-sector providers which
have to be paid for out of a separate budget, or at rates
higher than the set prices, for political,16  technical, legal
or practical reasons.
Again, the specialist literature has concluded that
the efficiency of payment methods varies depending
on the level or degree of complexity of the medical
conditions they are applied to. Consequently, there is
now a greater inclination to use per capita payments
for primary care and gradually extend this method to
all types of provision currently paid for through special
programmes, when enough epidemiological and
financial information exists for this switch to be made.
To put it another way, the per capita payment system
seems to be easy to implement for the treatment of
medical conditions that do not create many
uncertainties, either because routine methods of
resolving them are strictly prescribed or because they
are of relatively low complexity. Nonetheless, payment
can continue to be made under special programmes for
provision of an exceptional nature.
With the benefit of experience, meanwhile, the
health authorities in Chile have been bringing into the
Assessed Treatment Programme (Programa de
Prestaciones Valoradas (PPV)) a group of programmes
of different kinds whose common aim is gradually to
reduce the proportion of public health spending
allocated on a historical basis. This group of
programmes has enabled the best financing methods
to be chosen for each situation. The association of
payments with specific services (as with PADs) is
attractive because it is easy to quantify, but it has been
criticized by public service managers on the grounds
that it usually fails to take account of the fixed
infrastructure, equipment and maintenance costs that
have to be met for medical care to be available when
needed.
The most important lesson is that, ultimately, there
is no one method of payment that is ideal in all
circumstances, and there is thus no “cookery book” that
can be used to copy recipes applied in other contexts.
The need for good performance in different areas
(efficiency, quality, equity) is leading many countries
to combine a variety of payment methods with a view
to enhancing the favourable aspects of each and
mitigating their adverse effects.
1. Copayments
The medical treatment guarantees are partly about
making proper use of the funds available, so that
copayments are a source of income for public services
or the public insurer and represent a key issue in the
reform. How effective the system of copayments is at
raising more funds will depend on the willingness of
individuals to pay for higher-quality services. This
assumes that at least some of the resources thus raised
go into improving the quality of care, for example by
increasing the availability of drugs. In any event,
copayments need to be low enough to leave access to
care unaffected, but high enough to discourage
unnecessary use of medical services.
Most empirical studies that have set out to measure
the price-elasticity of health-care demand have found
that demand does indeed fall when prices rise, but
moderately (price-elasticity below one). This implies
that a rise in copayments will mobilize private resources
but will have only limited implications for freedom of
manoeuvre in reallocating public subsidies, since usage
levels among those who pay will vary only very
moderately.
A study dealing with Peru (Valdivia, 2002) argues
that “the price-elasticities of demand for health services
in public establishments would appear to be greater
among those of a higher socio-economic level. This
being so, a policy of raising charges for better-off
individuals in public facilities would result in that
demand being displaced to private-sector alternatives,
rather than to the medical facilities recovering some of
their costs.”
As we have seen, a number of groups were already
exempted from copayments before the reform laws
were passed: users of primary care, older adults and
people suffering from catastrophic illnesses. To prevent
abuse of treatment services (moral hazard), however, it
is normal practice for copayments to be required.
Consequently, maximum copayments of 10% and 20%
have been set for services provided to higher-income
FONASA subscribers, while copayments of 20% apply
to Isapre-provided services included in Plan AUGE.
Following the logic laid down by the Executive,
16 This is a reference to geographical priorities set by the political
authorities.
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TABLE 9
Chile: Plan AUGE, coverage in 2005
No. Health problem Age group
1 Terminal chronic kidney failure All
2 Operable congenital cardiopathies < 15
3 Cervical cancer All
4 Pain relief for advanced cancer and palliative care All
5 Severe heart attack All
6 Type 1 diabetes mellitus All
7 Type 2 diabetes mellitus All
8 Breast cancer > 15
9 Spinal dysraphias All
10 Surgical treatment for scoliosis < 25
11 Surgical treatment for cataracts All
12 Full hip replacement for people with arthrosis of the hip entailing severe functional limitation > 65
13 Cleft palate All
14 Cancer < 15
15 Schizophrenia All
16 Testicular cancer > 15
17 Lymphomas > 15
18 Acquired immune deficiency syndrome HIV/AIDS All
19 Acute lower respiratory infection, treated on an out-patient basis < 5
20 Pneumonia acquired in the community, treated on an out-patient basis > 65
21 Primary or essential arterial hypertension > 15
22 Non-refractory epilepsy < 15
23 General oral health for children < 6
24 Disturbances in impulse generation and conduction requiring a pacemaker > 15
25 Premature delivery. Prevention of premature delivery. Retinopathy in premature infants. Bronchopulmonary
dysplasia in premature infants. Bilateral neurosensorial hypoacusia in premature infants < 1 month
Source: Prepared by the author.
financial protection for health problems covered by Plan
AUGE should maintain and/or increase benefits, since
health problems have been selected with a view to
relieving the burden of illness to the greatest possible
extent.
In the case of financial protection too, however,
consideration must be given to the cumulative effects
that may arise from the simultaneous treatment of a
number of problems in one illness or a number of people
in the same family. Although maximum copayments
have been set at levels that are low for most services,
they can add up to large amounts and cause serious
financial hardship. To prevent this, a maximum yearly
limit has been set, calculated as a proportion of the
user’s annual income, so that those with higher incomes
contribute more in absolute terms.
The law passed provides that the indigent and those
without resources (groups A and B among FONASA
beneficiaries) are to be treated free of charge. Everyone
else (subscribing to Isapres or FONASA) will pay no more
than 20% of their treatment costs, in accordance with
the scale of charges established for medical conditions
covered by the explicit guarantees. Since this percentage
may prove excessive in the case of high-cost illnesses,
people will be entitled to 100% financing of copayments
in excess of two monthly remunerations or thereabouts,
or about 1.47 monthly remunerations in the case of
group C FONASA subscribers. If there is more than one
illness, annual payments may not exceed three monthly
remunerations, approximately.
In view of all the above, the decision was taken to
implement Plan AUGE gradually, the result being that
treatment for 25 health conditions has been guaranteed
since July 2005 (table 9). A further 32 will be
incorporated over the coming years, until all 57 medical
conditions originally identified in the Plan are covered.
2. Risk compensation funds
Risk compensation funds are vital for equity. In Chile,
the insurers (FONASA and the Isapres) have to pay a
universal premium for each subscriber and for each of
their respective dependants into the Social
Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación
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Solidario (FCS)). The contributions for beneficiaries
qualifying as indigent are financed by a direct fiscal
subsidy.
The main objective of the FCS is to reduce
incentives for the “skimming”17  practised by the private
insurers to hold down costs, as this undermines health-
care solidarity. The idea is that the FCS should operate
as a cost levelling system so that it makes no difference
to these insurers, financially speaking, whether they
cover higher-risk groups or not. The goal is that, once
resources have been redistributed by risk, the actual
revenues of the insurers should be the same irrespective
of risk weightings.
For this, a universal premium has to be calculated
and then adjusted for the risk weights, of which there
may be many, although as a minimum they generally
include sex and age. If the universal premium were
higher than a subscriber’s contribution (as with the
indigent), the difference would be covered by a fiscal
subsidy.
The compensation fund discussed in Chile (it has
not been approved) is virtual, i.e., it operates through
transfers of balances rather than of the contribution made
by each operator in the year the Plan is expected to be
operating in its entirety. Although there are different ways
of constructing funds of this type, the method applied in
Chile was first to arrive at a value for the average health
risks of the population. People who are at higher risk,
and thus more expensive, will be partially funded from
resources paid in by lower-risk individuals, something
that implies transfers of funds from insurers with lower-
risk subscribers to those with more vulnerable ones. In
this case, it is the insurance organizations, not individuals,
that receive the funds.
VI
Conclusions
At the time of writing, it is premature to evaluate Plan
AUGE and the changes being made to it to ensure that
the measures taken are consistent with reality, but this
kind of follow-up will need to be carried out and the
results presented to the scientific and academic
community and the general public.
Everything seems to show that there is no one
“right” institutional solution, no single “winning” model
that can be applied in all situations to resolve today’s
health-care challenges. Here we have described the
essential thrust of some partial programmes that existed
in the Chilean public sector to improve access to health
services for those who lacked the necessary resources,
as they were explicitly targeted at these groups. The
store of experience built up through these plans has
been indispensable, too, to the realization of a scheme
as ambitious as Plan AUGE in Chile.
For its part, Plan AUGE will provide a universal,
enforceable right to treatment in the public and
private health systems for 56 medical conditions, of
which some are already covered and the rest will have
been gradually included by 2007. This enforceability,
combined with universal access, timeliness, quality
criteria and financial protection, represents a
qualitative leap in equity in the Chilean health
system.
Public health spending has never recovered
from the low levels of the 1980s and still averages
just US$ 139 annually per inhabitant, which means
that the direct fiscal contribution has had to play a
compensating role in recent years. This fiscal
contribution reduces the initial inequity between
public insurance and the private insurance schemes
from a ratio of 1:4 to approximately 3:4.
17 See footnote 4.
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